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I. JURISDICTION 
The district court's February 5, 2009, Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment, 
resolved all remaining claims in the action, thereby constituting a final judgment within 
the meaning of UTAH R. APP. P. 4(a). The notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme Court 
was filed on February 18, 2009, within 30 days after the date of entry of the final 
judgment, as required by UTAH R. APP. P. 4(a). 
The Utah Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(j). The Utah Supreme Court transferred this appeal for 
decision to this Court pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(4). This Court 
therefore has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-
4-103(2)©. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
ISSUE NO. 1. DOES THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGE TORT 
CAUSES OF ACTION IN COUNTS II THROUGH VII TO STATE A CLAIM? 
Standard of appellate review: 
The district court granted judgment on the pleadings pursuant to UTAH R. CIV. P. 
12(c), as to Counts II through VII of the First Amended Complaint. The standard for 
reviewing the district court's action on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is 
correctness. Peck v. State, 2008 UT 39, at U 7, 191 P.3d 4, 6 ("We review the district 
court's denial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings for correctness, granting no 
deference to the district court's ruling."). 
The correctness review of a district court's decision granting judgment on the 
pleadings is in all respects the same as the review of a decision on a motion to dismiss 
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for failure to state a claim under UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Golding v. Ashley Central 
Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897, 898 (Utah 1990)("The grant of a motion for judgment on 
the pleadings is reviewed under the same standard as the grant of a motion to dismiss, 
i.e., we affirm the grant of such a motion only if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff 
could not recover under the facts alleged. And in considering the factual allegations 
in the complaint, we take [the pleaded facts] as true and consider them and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. 
[Emphasis added.]") 
ISSUE NO. 2. ARE THE PLEADED TORT CLAIMS BARRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, BY 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT OR JUDICIAL 
IMMUNITY? 
Standard of appellate review: 
The district court granted judgment on the pleadings pursuant to UTAH R. CIV. P. 
12(c), as to Counts II through VII of the First Amended Complaint. The standard for 
reviewing the district court's action on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is 
correctness. Peck v. State, 2008 UT 39, at H 7, 191 P.3d 4, 6 ("We review the district 
court's denial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings for correctness, granting no 
deference to the district court's ruling."). 
The correctness review of a district court's decision granting judgment on the 
pleadings is in all respects the same as the review of a decision on a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim under UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Golding v. Ashley Central 
Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897, 898 (Utah 1990)("The grant of a motion for judgment on 
the pleadings is reviewed under the same standard as the grant of a motion to dismiss, 
i.e., we affirm the grant of such a motion only if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff 
could not recover under the facts alleged. And in considering the factual allegations 
in the complaint, we take [the pleaded facts] as true and consider them and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. 
[Emphasis added.]") 
III. STATUTES AND RULES OF IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
UNITED STATES CONST, AMEND. IV: [Search and Seizure.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
UNITED STATES CONST, AMEND. XIV, CL. 1: [Citizenship Rights.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONST, ART. I, § 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden - Issuance of 
warrant] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; 
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
person or thing to be seized. 
UTAH CONST, ART. I, § 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 1(a): 
General provisions, (a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the 
procedure in the courts of the state of Utah in all actions, suits, and 
proceedings of a civil nature, whether cognizable at law or in equity, and 
in all special statutory proceedings, except as governed by other rules 
promulgated by this court or enacted by the Legislature and except as 
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stated in Rule 81. They shall be liberally construed to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 8(a): 
General rules of pleadings, (a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets 
forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim 
or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a demand for 
judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the 
alternative or of several different types may be demanded. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 8(c): 
Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set 
forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, 
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, 
duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow 
servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, 
statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an 
avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly 
designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, 
the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleadings as if 
there had been a proper designation. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 8(e): 
Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency, (e)(1) Each averment of a 
pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms of 
pleading or motions are required. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 8(f): 
Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(c): 
Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but 
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment 
on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters 
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity 
to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves certain tort claims for abuse of process, trespass to land and 
chattels, conversion, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
civil conspiracy. The remaining defendants are attorneys who conspired with their 
client to misuse process, in the form of an unconstitutional private search warrant, to 
invade an ex-employees home for the ulterior purpose of shocking, frightening and 
intimidating current employees into signing new employment agreements. Armed with 
an unconstitutional private search warrant, the co-conspirators lied about their legal 
standing to invade the home, made threats of physical force and detention to gain entry 
into plaintiffs' home, search it and steal plaintiffs' property. 
On a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), the trial court 
improperly made multiple merits-based rulings and failed to afford the pleaded factual 
allegations the primacy and construction favorable to plaintiffs that they must be given 
under the rules on a pleadings motion. 
B. Course of Proceedings & Disposition By Trial Court 
Following the filing of their answer, defendants filed a motion for judgment on the 
pleadings as to Counts II through VII of the First Amended Complaint, under Rule 12(c). 
The trial court heard argument and issued its Ruling on Motion on March 28, 2007, 
dismissing Counts II through VII. R. 465-468. An order was entered on May 10, 2007. 
R. 476-477. 
Defendants then moved for summary judgment as to Count I. That motion was 
denied, R. 495-499, R. 501-502. On a discretionary appeal, this Court reversed the 
denial of that partial summary judgment, Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & 
Loveless, 2008 UT App 405, 197 P.3d 659, after which the trial court entered such 
partial summary judgment on February 5, 2009. R. 676-678. The appeal from that final 
judgment was filed timely on February 18, 2009, R. 701-712. 
C. Brief Statement of the Facts of the Case 
This case is about civil torts committed in the course of an illegal private search 
and seizure. Defendants/appellees are lawyers who participated in a conspiracy with 
their client, lomed, Inc. ("lomed"), to enter the home of Moss and lomed's former 
employee, Yanaki, without consent, ostensibly for the purpose of conducting discovery 
and preserving evidence, but in fact for the ulterior motive of sending a message to 
other lomed employees that if they did not sign new employment contracts, they would 
be subjected to the same mistreatment. 
1. On April 9, 2002, a complaint was filed against Yanaki and others, but not 
Moss, in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah in a case captioned 
lomed, Inc. v. Jamal Yanaki, Activatek, LLC, Ceramatec, Inc., Ashok Joshi and John 
Does /~X, Case No. 020903031. First Amended Complaint ("FAC") U 5, R. 130. 
2. The following day, on April 10, 2002, lomed and its lawyers, defendants 
Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, P.C. ("Law Firm"), Clark Waddoups 
("Waddoups"), Jonathan O. Hafen ("Hafen") and Justin Matkin ("Matkin"), filed an Ex 
Parte Motion for Order to Conduct Immediate Discovery to Prevent the Destruction or 
Alteration of Evidence (the "Search Motion"). At the time they caused such Search 
Motion to be filed, defendants knew that the relief they sought was illegal under both 
the Constitutions of the State of Utah and of the United States of America. FAC U 6, R. 
130-131. 
3. Although the co-conspirators purported by the Search Motion to seek a 
legal process for ostensibly lawful purposes, i.e., to protect trade secrets and conduct 
discovery, they in fact sought a legal process for illegal purposes and with ulterior 
motivations. FAC1J7, R. 131. 
4. Yanaki had left lomed's employment approximately three months before 
the Search Motion was filed, lomed was at the time of the filing of the Search Motion, 
seeking to get its employees to sign new forms of non-compete agreements, lomed 
desired to misuse a legal process to cause an illegal raid on the Yanaki's home as a 
form of message to its employees that they would be better off signing new agreements 
than leaving and risking their own homes being raided. The ulterior motive of misusing 
the legal process to conduct the Illegal Search and Seizure of the Home was thus 
designed to put an exclamation point on the dangers to lomed employees of leaving 
lomed rather than signing the new forms of agreements. FAC U 8, R. 131. 
5. Defendants agreed to help their client, lomed, place such exclamation 
point by seeking legal process purporting to authorize a search and seizure by the 
police, and by using the diversionary approach to the state judge of ostensibly 
protecting trade secrets and conducting discovery in civil litigation, rather than what they 
were really doing, namely, seeking to have the Police conduct an illegal raid. FAC <[j 9, 
R. 131. 
6. However, as defendants knew, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-204(2)(a), as it 
existed at the time, expressly limited the class of applicants for a search warrant to a 
"peace officer o r . . . prosecuting attorney." The defendants knew they did not fit into 
either such class. FAC H 10, R. 132. 
7. In addition, defendants knew that private search warrants have long been 
outlawed. FAC U 11, R. 132-133. 
8. Defendants knew at the time they agreed to seek such legal process that 
it would constitute a violation of, inter alia, UTAH CONST, ART. I, § 14, 23-24, according to 
the holding of Allen v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36, 49, 110 P.2d 355, 361 (1941), as well as 
U.S. CONST, AMEND. IV, V, XIV, to use such legal process to conduct a search and 
seizure at a private home. FAC H 12, R. 133. 
9. The legal process obtained, the Search Order, was unlawful for any such 
purpose. FAC H 13, R. 133. 
10. At approximately 8:00 a.m. on Monday morning, April 15, 2002, Matkin 
and Salt Lake County Sheriffs Deputy, Heinz Kopp ("Kopp"), rang the doorbell of the 
Home three separate times, awakening Moss. Kopp and the Police agreed to join the 
conspiracy, by misusing the legal process to commit the Illegal Search and Seizure, 
and to be paid by the conspirators for doing so, no later than this time. FAC 1j 14, R. 
133. 
11. Yanaki was then in the state of Colorado. FAC U 15, R. 133. 
12. Moss, still in her pajamas, looked through the small window in the front 
door and saw a police officer, whom she did not then know was Kopp, with another 
man, whom she did not then know was Matkin. Only because of the Police presence, 
Moss answered the door to her Home. Kopp handed Moss a summons, complaint and 
copy of the legal process in the form of the Search Order. FAC U 16, R. 133. 
13. After reading portions of the Search Order and seeing that is was directed 
to Yanaki, Moss advised Matkin and Kopp that Yanaki was not Home and she would 
not allow them in her Home without Yanaki being present. FAC U 17, R. 134. 
14. Matkin then said "We can come in now, or we can come in later." Kopp, 
to support Matkin's statement and to intimidate Moss, said: "We can kick in this door," 
and Matkin advised Moss that he was going to get a further legal process. FAC fl 18, 
R. 134. 
15. Matkin then left while Kopp remained, surveying the Home. FAC H 19, R. 
134. 
16. Matkin then, in furtherance of Kopp's threat to kick down the door to gain 
entrance to Moss and Yanaki's Home, made a second, ex parte, approach to Judge 
Medley the morning of April 15, 2002, requesting a further legal process in the form of a 
writ of assistance for the Search Order. FAC H 20, R. 134. 
17. Matkin obtained the second legal process he sought on lomed's behalf, 
and procured Judge Medley's signature on a writ of assistance, captioned: 
"Supplemental Order in Aid of Enforcement" (hereinafter "Writ of Assistance") and 
dated and entered by the Court on April 15, 2002. The Writ of Assistance, no different 
than the Search Order, constituted a legal process that, under both the Constitutions of 
the State of Utah and the United States of America, could not be lawfully used to 
conduct a search and seizure. FAC U 21, R. 134. 
18. The Writ of Assistance expressly directed the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Office first, "to enter the residence and home address of Defendant Jamal Yanaki, 385 
North Wall Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84103" and, then, "use reasonable force, if 
necessary and appropriate under the circumstances, to execute the Order [Allowing 
Immediate Discovery to Prevent the Destruction or Alteration of Evidence], including 
entering through unlocked doors, conducting a search of the premises, and detaining 
any person who resists enforcement of the Order." FAC U 22, R. 134-135. 
19. The Writ of Assistance was obtained solely at the request of a private 
party in civil litigation. FAC H 23, R. 135. 
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20. Matkin returned to Moss' Home with the Writ of Assistance, and Matkin, 
Kopp and two other co-conspirators came to the door of Moss' Home while the illegal 
Writ of Assistance was served on Moss. FAC U 27, R. 136. 
21. Moss, under the illegal threat of having the door to her Home kicked in 
and under the illegal threat of being "detained" if she interfered with the illegal search 
and seizure, had no voluntary alternative and stepped aside as Matkin, Kopp and two of 
the other co-conspirators illegally entered her Home and commenced the Illegal Search 
and Seizure. FAC U 28, R. 136. Shortly thereafter, another Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Deputy, Sergeant Kendra Herlin, also arrived to reinforce the illegal threat to "detain" 
Moss if she attempted to stop the Illegal Search and Seizure. FAC ^ 29, R. 136. 
22. Kopp, Matkin and the two other co-conspirators who illegally entered the 
Home without lawful authority, justification or consent, then illegally searched it and 
illegally seized property belonging to Moss, Yanaki and third parties. FAC ^ 30, R. 136. 
23. The property of Yanaki and Moss was then taken, without the consent of 
either, to, on information and belief, the place of business of one of the co-conspirators. 
FAC H 31, R. 137. 
24. On April 14, 2003, Moss and Yanaki each filed suit against defendants 
and certain other private co-conspirators in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah, seeking relief under the federal civil rights laws and under state law. 
That action was dismissed, as to the federal claims, the district court finding that the 
actions of the private defendants did not amount to "state action" as is required to 
sustain a federal civil rights claim. However, the district judge expressly found, referring 
in part to the same defendants who appear now before this Court: "The invasion of 
Plaintiff's home, supported only by an ex parte submission of Plaintiffs' opponents in a 
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civil lawsuit, appears to be precisely the type of unreasonable intrusion into a private 
dwelling that the Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent. Defendants' protestations 
to the contrary, an ex parte motion presented to a judge in the course of civil litigation is 
not the equivalent of a probable cause search warrant affidavit submitted by an 
independent law enforcement officer. If there was a sufficient basis for finding that 
Defendants' actions in this case were committed under color of state law, this Court 
would find that Plaintiffs were deprived of a right secured by the 'Constitution and Laws' 
of the United States." Yanakiv. lomed, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1264 n.7 (D. Utah 
2004), aff'd 415 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2005), cert, denied sub nom. Yanaki v. Parr, 
Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, 126 S.Ct. 1910, 164 LEd.2d 663 (2006). The 
district court suggested the possibility that defendants' conduct may give rise to an 
abuse of process claim: "As noted in footnote seven, above, the behavior of the 
Defendants may have been inadvisable and abusive of Plaintiffs' rights, and may or 
may not give rise to other legal causes of action, such as perhaps abuse of process, 
but the Defendants' actions were undisputedly not initiated by the state, and therefore 
pursuant to the precedent referred to in the body of this opinion may not serve as a 
basis for a claim under § 1983." Id. at 1265 n.8. FAC fl 34, R. 137-138. 
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court improperly made merits-based decisions as a predicate for 
granting dismissal based on a pleadings motion. The trial court overlooked the 
pleading of an ulterior motive in the improper use of judicial process, the 
unconstitutionality of the process, itself, negating its effect to justify an illegal civil 
search and seizure and overlooked that the action is premised not upon any statement 
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of defendants or their co-conspirators, but rather the unreasonable and unlawful 
invasion of plaintiffs' home and theft of property from that home. 
The trial court's reliance on judicial privilege, first amendment privilege and (at 
least to some degree, collateral estoppel), are entirely merits-based rulings which 
cannot stand in the face of the allegations of improper motive and illegality of conduct. 
According to the trial court, Utah law affords no relief against abusers of civil process, 
which process itself is unconstitutional, physical invaders of homes under threat of 
violence and thieves of property from the home. So long as any ex-employer chooses 
to file a theft of trade secrets claim, that ex-employers' attorneys have the imprimatur of 
the Utah courts to wreak havoc on the private lives of ex-employees and their families. 
The Common Law of England for over a millennium recognized that such abuses were 
actionable, yet plaintiffs' rights to a remedy and justice, under the provisions of the Utah 
and United States Constitutions, under Rules 1, 8(c), 12(b)(6) and 12(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure are trumped, according to the trial court, any time a complaint 
has been filed. Even in an abuse of process case. Even where the conduct is separate 
from the complaint. This bad policy cannot stand any more than the trial court's 
reversal of Men v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36, 49, 110 P.2d 355, 361 (1941), which held all 
private search warrants unconstitutional and invalid. This trial court, however, says 
searches are justified when they are in favor of a special class of citizen, the ex-employer 
asserting theft of trade secret claims. The trial court's ruling is contrary to Allen, the 
constitutions, the rules and good common sense; it must, respectfully, be reversed. 
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VI. ARGUMENT 
The correctness review of a district court's decision granting judgment on the 
pleadings is in all respects the same as the review of a decision on a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim under UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Golding v. Ashley Central 
Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897, 898 (Utah 1990)("The grant of a motion for judgment on 
the pleadings is reviewed under the same standard as the grant of a motion to dismiss, 
i.e., we affirm the grant of such a motion only if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff 
could not recover under the facts alleged. And in considering the factual allegations 
in the complaint, we take [the pleaded facts] as true and consider them and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. 
[Emphasis added.]") Under that standard, plaintiffs clearly have stated a claim for relief. 
I. THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT SUFFICIENTLY PLEADS TORT CLAIMS FOR 
RELIEF BASED ON THE CONDUCT OF THE CONSPIRACY IN CONDUCTING AN 
ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE. 
The standard for reviewing defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is 
the same as the standard for reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
under UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). See Golding v. Ashley Central Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 
897, 898 (Utah 1990).1 The motion must, therefore, be denied if any set of facts could 
be proved in support of plaintiffs' claims. See, e.g., Arrow Industries, Inc. v. Zions First 
National Bank, 767 P.2d 965 (Utah 1988)("A motion to dismiss is only appropriate 
1
"The grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed under the 
same standard as the grant of a motion to dismiss, i.e., we affirm the grant of such a 
motion only if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not recover under the facts alleged. 
And in considering the factual allegations in the complaint, we take them as true and 
consider them and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable 
to the plaintiff." 
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where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to reiief under any 
state of facts which could be proved in support of its claim."); Pett v. Fleet Mortgage 
Corp., 2004 UT App. 150, U 7, 91 P.3d 854, 856. 
Such circumstances, where no set of facts could be proven in support of a claim, 
exist in very narrow circumstances, such as where the claim cannot exist as a matter of 
law, due to preemption, see, e.g., Mounteerv. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055, 
1059, (Utah 1991) (negligence claim properly dismissed as preempted by Workers' 
Compensation Statutes), or the absence of statutory support for a claim premised on a 
statute, see Pett, 2004 UT App. 150, at ffll 9-10, 12, 91 P.3d at 856-57. 
A- The FAC Pleads a Claim for Abuse of Process, 
"A claim for abuse of process requires the plaintiff to show (1) that the defendant 
used legal process, (2) to accomplish an improper purpose or purpose for which that 
process was not designed, (3) causing the plaintiffs harm." Mountain West Surgical 
Center, LLC. v. Hospital Corporation of Utah, 2007 UT 92, at U 11, 173 P.3d 1276, 
1278. The FAC plainly pleads each of theses elements. 
For example, paragraph 3 alleges: "This case arises out of a successful 
conspiracy to misuse a legal process and to cause an illegal search of the Home and 
seizure of property therein by the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office (the "Police"), 
named defendant Justin P. Matkin ("Matkin") and certain unnamed co-conspirators." 
FAC, TJ 3, R. 130. This allegation plainly asserts the use of legal process, the first 
element of the cause of action. Paragraphs 27-28 allege that defendants used yet 
another legal process to consummate their illegal search and seizure, providing yet 
another basis for abuse of process. See FAC ffif 27-28, R. 136. 
Then, paragraph 8 specifically alleges an ulterior motive in the abusive use of 
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process: "lomed desired to misuse a legal process to cause an illegal raid on the Home 
as a form of message to its employees that they would be better off signing new 
agreements than leaving and risking their own homes being raided. The ulterior motive 
of misusing the legal process to conduct the Illegal Search and Seizure of the Home 
was thus designed to put an exclamation point on the dangers to lomed employees of 
leaving lomed rather than signing the new form of agreements." FAC, U 8, R. 131. This 
allegation plainly asserts the use of legal process for both an improper purpose and a 
purpose for which it was not designed, either of which satisfies the second element of 
the cause of action. 
Count II, Abuse of Process, R. 139-140, incorporates all of the foregoing and 
more predicate acts constituting the consummation of the conspiratorial scheme to 
assist lomed in its ulterior motivation for misusing the legal processes obtained and 
resulting in injury to plaintiffs. These include threats to Moss to kick in the door of her 
house. FAC K 18, R. 134, threats to strip her of her liberty by "detaining" her, FAC ffi] 
22, 27-29, R. 135-136 all of which was to establish a threat of intimidation to use 
against current lomed employees. 
Property was seized from the home, including property belonging to Moss, even 
though she was not even a party to the lawsuit. FAC U 31, R. 137. Each of the 
plaintiffs was injured by this extraordinary abuse and unconstitutional use of civil 
process, in the unconstitutional deprivation of their privacy, emotional well-being and 
physical well-being caused by the acts of the conspirators. FAC fflj 46-47, R. 139-140. 
A cognizable claim has thus been pleaded. 
B. The FAC Pleads a Claim for Invasion of Privacy. 
In order to prevail on their invasion of privacy claim, plaintiffs "must prove two 
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elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that there was 'an intentional 
substantial intrusion, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of the 
complaining party,' and (2) that the intrusion 'would be highly offensive to the 
reasonable person/" Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, 944 P.2d 374, 378 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997). The pleaded awakening of Moss, threat to kick her door in and detain her 
and non-consensual invasion and search of Moss and Yanaki's home, surveillance of 
the home and seizure of their property, FAC ffij 14-31, R. 133-137, could not be viewed 
by any reasonable person as anything but an intentional, substantial intrusion upon the 
seclusion of plaintiffs that is extremely outrageous. The elements of the claim are 
pleaded in FAC ffil 48-53, R. 140-141. A claim has been stated. 
C. The FAC Pleads a Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress. 
In order to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show: 
"(i) the [defendant's] conduct [complained of] was outrageous and intolerable in that it 
offended . . . generally accepted standards of decency and morality; (ii) [the defendant] 
intended to cause, or acted in reckless disregard of the likelihood of causing, emotional 
distress; (iii) [the plaintiff] suffered severe emotional distress; and (iv) [the defendant's] 
conduct proximately caused [the] emotional distress." Prince v. Bear River Mut Ins. 
Co., 2002 UT 68, U 37, 56 P.3d 524, 535. Again, all elements are met by the illegal 
home invasion. The conspirators plainly intended to instill fear by their threat of 
violence in kicking in the door to the home, their threat to detain Moss and their 
surveillance of the home. The conspirators seized property that did not belong to them 
and hauled it away. There could be little more disturbing to any person than the 
conduct exhibited by the conspirators in this case. Plaintiffs pleaded that the conduct of 
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the conspirators in fact caused them severe emotional distress, even causing physical 
injury in Yanaki's case. FAC fflj 54-61, R. 141-142. A claim has been stated. 
D. The FAC Pleads a Claim for Trespass to Land and Chattels. 
"The gist of an action of trespass is infringement on the right of possession." 
John Price Associates, Inc. v. Utah State Conference, Bricklayers Locals Nos. 1, 2 &6, 
615 P.2d 1210, 1214 (Utah 1980). The FAC pleads that plaintiffs "were, at all times 
material hereto, lawfully in possession of the Home and its contents." FAC U 63, R. 
142. The FAC further pleads that the "invasion of the Home" and "the seizure of 
plaintiffs' private financial records and property, as well as Yanaki's confidential medical 
records, was a trespass to land and chattels." FAC ]j 64, R. 142. Again, a claim has 
been stated. 
E. The FAC Pleads a Claim for Conversion. 
Conversion requires "an intent to exercise dominion or control over goods 
inconsistent with the owner's rights." Allred v. Hinkley, 8 Utah 2d 73, 328 P.2d 726, 728 
(Utah 1958). There can be no doubt that the seizure of plaintiffs' property, which has 
never been returned, adequately pleads a conversion. 
F. The FAC Pleads a Claim for Civil Conspiracy. 
"To prove civil conspiracy, five elements must be shown: '(1) a combination of 
two or more persons, (2) an object to be accomplished, (3) a meeting of the minds on 
the object or course of action, (4) one or more unlawful, overt acts, and (5) damages as 
a proximate result thereof.'" Alta Industries, Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1290 n.17 
(Utah 1993)(quoting Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987)). The FAC pleads "This case arises out of a successful conspiracy to misuse a 
legal process and to cause an illegal search of the Home and seizure of property 
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therein by the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office (the "Police"), named defendant Justin 
P. Matkin ("Matkin") and certain unnamed co-conspirators." FAC U 3, R. 130. It 
continues: "lomed conspired with the named defendants to cause the misuse of a legal 
process and the Illegal Search and Seizure by the Police, pursuant to which the Police 
and the co-conspirators, some of whom are the named defendants herein, committed 
the torts alleged herein. The details are set forth below." FAC U 4, R. 130. lomed's 
motive is pleaded: "Yanaki had left lomed's employment approximately three months 
before the Search Motion was filed. Co-conspirator lomed was, during the material time 
period surrounding the filing of the Search Motion, seeking to get its employees to sign 
new forms of non-compete agreements, lomed desired to misuse a legal process to 
cause an illegal raid on the Home as a form of message to its employees that they 
would be better off signing new agreements than leaving and risking their own homes 
being raided. The ulterior motive of misusing the legal process to conduct the Illegal 
Search and Seizure of the Home was thus designed to put an exclamation point on the 
dangers to lomed employees of leaving lomed rather than signing the new form of 
agreements." FAC1J8, R. 131. 
A specific agreement between lomed and the named defendants to further the 
conspiracy is pleaded: "Defendants agreed to help their client, lomed, place such 
exclamation point by seeking legal process purporting to authorize a search and seizure 
by the police, and by using the diversionary approach to the state judge of ostensibly 
protecting trade secrets and conducting discovery in civil litigation, rather than what they 
were really doing, namely, seeking to have the Police conduct an illegal raid." FAC U 9, 
R. 131. Culpable knowledge on the part of defendants is pleaded: "However, as 
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defendants knew, UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-204(2)(a) [2003]2 expressly limits the 
class of applicants for a search warrant to a 'peace officer or prosecuting attorney/ The 
defendants knew they did not fit into either such class." FAC U 10, R. 132; see also 
FAC ffil 11-13, R. 132-133. In addition to conspirator lomed's ulterior motivation, a 
specific, known object of the conspiracy was described in FAC fl 32, R. 137. Each of 
the conspirators is pled to have undertaken one or more acts in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. FAC U 78, R. 144. Unlawful acts, in the form of the underlying pleaded 
torts, see above, were pleaded to have been committed in furtherance of the 
conspiracy. Plaintiffs pleaded that the conspiracy was the cause-in-fact and legal 
cause of damages to them. FAC U 79-80, R. 143-144. Again, a cognizable claim was 
stated. 
II. IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO THROW OUT PLAINTIFF'S LEGALLY SUFFICIENT 
CLAIMS AT THE PLEADINGS STAGE OF THE LITIGATION. 
A. The Trial Court Improperly Made Merits Rulings on a Pleadings 
Motion. 
This Court has warned against the general impropriety of dismissing actions at 
the pleadings stage on affirmative defenses. For example, this court has stated: 
"While Utah law recognizes a qualified privilege of the sort Uintah raises as a defense 
to Zoumadakis's claim of defamation, see Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 58 
(Utah 1991), in the posture the trial court dismissed her defamation claim, i.e., on a rule 
2The statute that was in effect at that time, since repealed, read: "The grounds 
for issuance and contents of the warrant issued pursuant to Subsection (2) shall be 
those required by this chapter. Prior to issuance of the warrant, the magistrate shall 
require the peace officer or the prosecuting attorney who is requesting the 
warrant to read to him verbatim the contents of the warrant." UTAH CODE ANN. § 
77-23-204(2)(a) (2003)(emphasis added). Therefore, the statutory law was clear that 
only peace officers or prosecutors could request a warrant. 
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12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, the thai court jumped the gun in concluding 
the privilege was dispositive." Id. This court continued its criticism of the tactic of 
raising affirmative defenses in the context of a motion to dismiss: 
In light of our analysis, it was not necessary for Zoumadakis to amend her 
complaint to include allegations anticipating and rebutting Uintah's 
claimed qualified privilege. In fact, the record shows that Uintah has not 
even properly pleaded privilege as an affirmative defense in answer to 
Zoumadakis's complaint. See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c). Instead, Uintah raised 
the issue for the first time in support of its 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 
Raising an affirmative defense, like a qualified privilege, for the first time in 
a 12(b)(6) motion is not generally appropriate since "dismissal under rule 
12(b)(6) is 'justified only when the allegations of the complaint itself clearly 
demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have a claim.'" Tucker v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, P7, 53 P.3d 947 (citation omitted) 
(emphasis in original). Thus, "affirmative defenses, which often raise 
issues outside of the complaint, are not generally appropriately raised in a 
motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6)." Id. Consequently, in the context of 
Uintah's 12(b)(6) motion, the burden of proving the abuse of any qualified 
privilege was not yet on Zoumadakis. The trial court should only have 
considered whether her complaint stated a claim upon which relief could 
be granted based on the allegations of the complaint itself, and not based 
on any possible affirmative defenses. 
Id. at 895 n.6. These criticisms of this practice are especially pertinent in the context of 
the pleaded claims here. 
The trial court made several rulings on the merits when the merits were not 
before it. For example, the trial court recognized that "the one offensive aspect of the 
execution of the discovery order was the presence of a lawyer from Parr Waddoups." 
Ruling on Motion, at R. 466 (emphasis added). It is not the prerogative of the trial court 
to decide what, as a factual matter, is offensive. 
The trial court did not even address the palpable unconstitutionality of the order 
under Allen v. Trueman, 100 Utah 36, 49, 110 P.2d 355, 361 (1941) ("Search warrants 
were never recognized by the common law as processes which might be availed of by 
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individuals in the course of civil proceedings or for the maintenance of any mere private 
right; but their use was confined to cases of public prosecutions, instituted and pursued 
for the suppression of crime or the detection and punishment of criminals." quoting 
People v. Kempner, 208 N.Y. 16, 101 N.E. 794, 797 (1913)). In Allen, the Utah Supreme 
Court plainly held that private search warrants of exactly the ilk used here were 
unconstitutional not only under the Fourth Amendment, but also under UTAH CONST. 
ART. I, §§ 14, 24. Allen, 100 Utah at 57, 110 P.2d at 364 ("Said section of the statute 
for the reasons herein stated is clearly violative of Sections 14 and 24, Article I, and 
subsection 16, section 26, of Article VI, of the Constitution of this state, as well as 
Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United Sates.") 
It is up to the trier of fact to determine whether the use of an unconstitutional 
order to invade a home is offensive and how offensive it is. The trial court also ruled on 
the merits that Moss and Yanaki were barred by collateral estoppel for not challenging 
the search order in the lomed action. Ruling on Motion, at R. 466. The trial court did 
not explain how plaintiff Moss, who was not a party, and plaintiff Yanaki, who was in the 
state of Colorado during the illegal search, could have made any challenge to prevent 
the illegal search and seizure. As the FAC pleads, the order was obtained ex parte. 
FAC HI] 6, 20, R. 130-131, 134. 
By the time Yanaki returned to Utah, the illegal search and seizure were a fait 
accompli and he and Moss were left with the devastation of the intrusion that could not 
be undone by the judge in the lomed action. Collateral estoppel has elements, none of 
which are mentioned by the trial court, which must be proven. The trial judge was in no 
position to treat those elements on a pleadings motion. 
The trial judge also ruled, again on the merits, that the discovery order was 
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"intended to affect Moss minimally." Ruling on Motion, at R. 467. How the trial court 
divined that intent is unclear, but it flies in the face of the pleaded facts that Moss was 
threatened with having her door kicked in and the pleaded motivation that lomed 
wanted a terroristic episode against Yanaki to use in convincing its other employees to 
sign new employment agreements, an allegation the trial court just disregarded. 
Another merits ruling: "The Parr Waddoups lawyer only did what the order 
authorized him to do." Ruling on Motion, at R. 467. The trial court, again, is in no 
position to rule on all the things that the Parr Waddoups lawyer did or did not do. 
Several things are clear from the pleading that happened which the search order did 
not authorize the Parr Waddoups lawyer to do, namely, support a physical threat to kick 
in the door to the Home, lie to Moss about the legal propriety of the order, seize 
property belonging to Moss and Yanaki, rather than lomed. 
The trial court also made merits rulings on the reasonableness of the order, 
somehow finding in the pleadings a basis to rule that "If Yanaki had indeed stolen trade 
secrets and they were on his computer, he would have ample opportunity to hide the 
material or destroy it. There is little reason to suppose that a person who would steal 
such things would not hide them or destroy them to avoid being finding out." Ruling on 
Motion, at R. 466. This ruling assumed that Yanaki was guilty of stealing trade secrets 
in the underlying action, again a merits-based decision. This ruling was reached even 
though Yanaki's counsel pointed out that the President and Chief Executive Officer of 
lomed had, in his deposition in the lomed case, confessed that the "Confidential New 
Product" which Yanaki had been accused of stealing could not, at the time of the 
President's deposition, be drawn by he or any other person at lomed because it was 
just a "product concept" and not something that could even be drawn. See Deposition 
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of RobertJ. Lollini, 3/11/03 ("Lollini Dep. II"), at267:2-4, R. 608 (sealed) at 50. 
Apparently, the trial court did not wish to convert the motion to one for summary 
judgment, but all of the voluminous evidence submitted to the trial court during oral 
argument on the motion, which is contained in R. 608, utterly and entirely refutes any 
good faith basis for the assertion that Yanaki stole anything at all and demonstrates that 
all of the sworn statements used to obtain the search order were replete with lies. 
B. JUDICIAL PRIVILEGE CANNOT, ON THE PLEADINGS, PROTECT DEFENDANTS 
AGAINST ALL OF PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGATIONS 
At the outset, defendants are not being sued for their conduct before a court or 
their filings with a court. They are not being sued for statements they made to a court. 
They are not being sued for petitioning a court. They are being sued for misusing court 
process for an ulterior motive for which it was not designed, i.e., helping lomed to send 
a message to its remaining employees to sign new employment contracts rather than 
leave. They are also sued for their tortious conduct which violated plaintiffs 
fundamental right of privacy. Defendants cannot obtain a shield from their misconduct 
by seeking unconstitutional process. Moss was not even a party to the lawsuit from 
which their illegal process derived. The process was not designed to allow a search 
and seizure, indeed, something outlawed for decades by decree of the Supreme Court 
of this state. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Kool v. Lee, 43 Utah 394, 143 P. 906 (1913), was 
confronted with an appeal of an abuse of process claim concerning an arrest warrant. 
The Court stated with respect to ulterior purpose: "There must, of course, be allegations 
and proof of a willful or intentional misuse or abuse of process, a willful and intentional 
misuse of it for some wrongful and unlawful object, or ulterior purpose not intended by 
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the law to effect." Id. at 909. In response to arguments that the execution of the arrest 
warrant merely followed its lawful purpose, as the Ruling on Motion here asserts, R. 
467 ("The discovery order was reasonable and necessary to preserve evidence. There 
are very few instances when this kind of discovery would be justified and this is one of 
them."),3 the Utah Supreme Court was unpersuaded: 
But here there are averments, and there is evidence to support them, that 
the criminal proceedings were instituted and the warrant of arrest 
procured and used, or caused to be used, by the defendant, not to 
vindicate the law, not to arrest and punish the plaintiff for the charged 
offense, but for a wrongful and unlawful purpose and ulterior object, to 
evict the plaintiff and her husband from, and to put the defendant in 
possession of, the premises-a purpose not intended by the law to effect 
by such a process-and by such misuse of the process the defendant in 
fact did evict and dispossess the plaintiff and her husband and put himself 
in possession, and, having accomplished that, the criminal proceedings 
ceased and were dismissed. We think that is an abuse of process and is 
actionable. 
Id. at 910. 
In the prior federal proceeding between these parties, the federal court held that 
the private search warrant was in fact not authorized by any law asserted as authority 
by defendants. See Yanaki v. lomed, 319 F. Supp.2d 1261, 1263 n.2 (D. Utah 2004) 
("Because the statutes and constitutional provisions cited in the lomed Memorandum 
and the Complaint do not, explicitly or implicitly, provide the state court with the 
authority to issue the Search Order, the constitutionality of these provisions is irrelevant 
and cannot establish a claim under § 1983."), aWd 415 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. 
denied sub nom. Yanaki v. Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless, 126 S.Ct. 1910, 
164 LEd.2d 663 (2006). The federal court further found that the search and seizure 
3Again, an improper ruling on the merits of the case when the trial court stood in 
no position to make such a merits-based ruling on a pleadings motion. 
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were unreasonable. See id. at 1267 n.7 ("The invasion of Plaintiff's home, supported 
only by an ex parte submission of Plaintiffs' opponents in a civil lawsuit, appears to be 
precisely the type of unreasonable intrusion into a private dwelling that the Fourth 
Amendment is designed to prevent. Defendants' protestations to the contrary, an ex 
parte motion presented to a judge in the course of civil litigation is not the equivalent of 
a probable cause search warrant affidavit submitted by an independent law 
enforcement officer.") 
Since the ostensible bases for authorization (to conduct discovery and to protect 
trade secrets) did not authorize the private search warrant, it was sought for an ulterior 
purpose as a matter of law, viz., to conduct an illegal search and seizure. In addition, 
plaintiffs pleaded specifically at least one ulterior purpose of defendants' client that 
defendants agreed to further by conducting the illegal search and seizure, namely, 
chilling employees from moving to other employment rather than sign non-compete 
agreements. See FAC ffif 8-9, R. 131.4 
The private search warrant was void to begin with. The Utah Supreme Court 
expressly outlawed private search warrants over sixty-five years ago, in Allen v. 
Trueman, 100 Utah 36; 110 P.2d 355 (1941), (holding unconstitutional under UTAH 
CONST, ART. I, §§ 14, 24, ART. VI, § 26, that portion of the Trade-Marks and Trade 
Names Act, REV. STAT. UTAH § 95-2-10 (1933) that authorized searches for, and 
seizures of, knockoff products.) The Utah Supreme Court carefully analyzed the 
4
 It is noteworthy that the trial court found collateral estoppel assertable against 
plaintiffs for not challenging the search order before the lomed case judge but the trial 
court found no reason to apply collateral estoppel against defendants who were actual 
parties to the federal action and did not appeal Jude Benson's express findings that the 
search was a constitutional violation, simply not state action. 
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interests of the state in such an action as follows: 
Moreover, it has generally been recognized that the legitimate use of the 
search warrant is restricted to public prosecutions, and that in no 
event may such proceeding be invoked for the protection of any 
mere private right It is a police weapon, and its use constitutes a valid 
exercise of the police power. 
Allen, 110 P.2d at 360 (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court quoted with 
approval a decision from the New York Court of Appeals: 
Search warrants were never recognized by the common law as processes 
which might be availed of by individuals in the course of civil proceedings 
or for the maintenance of any mere private right; but their use was 
confined to cases of public prosecutions, instituted and pursued for the 
suppression of crime or the detection and punishment of criminals.. . . 
All searches, therefore, which are instituted and pursued upon the 
complaint or suggestion of one party into the house or possessions of 
another, in order to secure a personal advantage, and not with any design 
to afford aid in the administration of justice in reference to acts or offenses 
in violation of penal laws, must be held to be unreasonable, and 
consequently under our Constitution unwarrantable, illegal, and void. 
Allen, 110 P.2d at 361 (quoting People v. Kempner, 208 N.Y. 16, 101 N.E. 794, 797 
(1913)). 
Further, specifically discussing the interests served by the Trade-Marks and 
Trade Names Act, the Utah Supreme Court stated: "The primary, if not the only purpose 
of such act, . . . appears to be the protection and enhancement of the good-will 
connected with the business of the owner of the mark." 110 P.2d at 361. The Act had 
no connection to criminal prosecutions and the Utah Supreme Court found that the Act 
bore "no actual relationship to the objects sought by the Act in a proper exercise of the 
police power" and found that the search and seizure provisions were unreasonable 
under UTAH CONST, ART. I, § 14. Id. In addition, because the Legislature had granted 
"a special privilege to a special group or class of persons, i.e., to those who are owners 
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of trademarks or trade names" the court found that the Act violated the constitutional 
guarantee against the granting of special privileges and for uniform operation of the 
laws, found in UTAH CONST. ART. VI, § 26. See Allen, 110 P.2d at 362. 
The Utah Supreme Court agreed with a decision from the Illinois Supreme Court 
concerning a similar statute in Illinois, where it concluded: "The Act is wholly for the 
benefit for the owners of personal property of this class, and is designed to give to the 
owners of personal property of this class rights and privileges not possessed by the 
owners of other classes of other property." 100 Utah at 53, 110 P.2d at 363 (quoting 
Lippman v. People, 175 III. 101, 51 N.E. 872 (1898). Thus, the Utah Supreme Court 
and the framers of the Utah Constitution have already spoken and determined that 
there is no public or governmental interest that could be served by a law allowing 
private owners of a particular class of property, here, trade secrets, to use the 
government to conduct searches for their private interest.5 See also Little v. Sowers, 
167 Kan. 72, 77, 204 P.2d 605, 608 (1949) (holding that allegations "charging and 
disclosing the procurance of void orders in probate court by appellee and the issuance 
of process thereon to appellant's injury and damage" "states a cause of action for 
abuse of process." 
Under the English Common Law, for almost a quarter of a millennium, tort causes 
of action for damages resulting from violations of fundamental rights have been allowed 
5
 Where a law does not expressly authorize a search, its illegality is even more 
palpable. Even a concern about destruction of records does not justify a court order 
when the legislature has not deigned to allow such a remedy. See Shankman v. 
Axelrod, 528 N.Y.Supp.2d 37, 38 (App. Div. 1988) (where statute does not allow 
expressly examination of records or files, it must be assumed that the legislature 
intended a subpoena to be adequate, "it is for the Legislature, not the courts, to fashion 
such an investigative tool, if one is required."). 
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where the violation purported to be under the auspices of an illegal court order. See 
Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hospital Center, 300 Md. 520, 479 A.2d 921 (Ct. App. 
1984): 
One of the earliest cases to illustrate this point was Wilkes v. Wood, 
Lofft's 1, 98 Eng.Rep. 489 (1763). In Wilkes, supra, the plaintiff 
recovered damages in a trespass action brought against an official in the 
office of the Secretary of State who entered his home and seized his 
papers upon an unlawful general warrant Lord Pratt, in his 
instructions to the jury, acknowledged that the official had acted "contrary 
to the fundamental principles of the constitution," id. at 19, [footnote 
omitted] and stated that the jury could consider the illegal conduct in 
assessing damages. 
Id., 300 Md. at 526, 479 A.2d at 924 (emphasis added).6 This precedent was binding 
upon the trial court and is binding on this Court, because the state of Utah declared the 
English Common law to be binding in its Courts upon statehood. See American Bush v. 
City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40 U 50 & n.17, 557 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, at 10, 13 n. 17 
("The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to, or in conflict with the 
constitution and laws of the United States, or the constitution and laws of this state, 
shall be the rule of decision in all the courts of this state." [quoting UTAH REV. STAT. § 
2488(1898)]. 
The conduct of a private search and seizure is "an act in the use of the process 
not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings." Anderson Development, 
2005 UT 36 at H 65, 116 P.3d at 341. Therefore, under Anderson Development, Kool, 
6
 The Washington Supreme Court, in Bostederv. City of Renton, 155 Wash.2d 
18, 117 P.3d 316 (2005)(en banc), recognized a common law trespass action despite 
the existence of the illegal order purportedly authorizing the trespass. The claim was 
dismissed as against defendants in their official capacity, for failure to provide a timely 
governmental notice of claim, but the case was remanded to allow the trespass claim to 
proceed if it was determined on remand that defendants acted in their individual 
capacity. See id., 155 Wash.2d at 35-37, 50-51, 117 P.3d at 324-25, 332. 
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Allen and Yanaki, the allegations of the FAC plainly state a claim for abuse of process. 
Cases cited to the trial court by the defendants compel no different conclusion. 
Defendants cited Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, 70 
P.3d 17, for the proposition that "[t]he Utah Supreme Court has adopted the rule in 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 cmt. b, that 'there is no action for abuse of 
process when the process is used for the purpose for which it is intended, but there is 
an incidental motive of spite or an ulterior purpose of benefit to the defendant/" That 
may be true, but defendants miss the point that the discovery process in civil litigation 
was never intended for the purpose of allowing searches and seizures of homes, which 
is the purpose for which defendants used it. 
Bennett more correctly stands for the proposition that "[a] plaintiff may state a 
cause of action for abuse of process against a person " 'who uses a legal process ... 
against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed."' 
Bennett, 2003 UT 9 U 47, 70 P.3d at 28. Defendants purported to use the discovery 
process, although it does not authorize searches and seizures, for the purpose of 
conducting a search and seizure so that their client could intimidate its remaining 
employees. That is actionable under Bennett.7 
Defendants are not being sued in this case for making any defamatory statement 
or, indeed, any statement at all. They are instead being sued for illegally searching 
plaintiffs' home and removing plaintiffs' property. Not one of the privilege cases cited 
7
 Defendants' citation below to Watters v. Dinn, 633 N.E.2d 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1994) is also inapposite. The process at issue in that case was a subpoena served to 
obtain records in discovery. See id. at 288-89. While the subpoena was defective in its 
form, there is no comparison between the use of a recognized and legitimate discovery 
tool and an illegal private search warrant and search and seizure. 
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by defendants involves suit over a non-consensual and illegal warrantless entry into a 
plaintiff's home and conduct of an illegal search and seizure. 
Nevertheless, defendants' argued below: "Courts have repeatedly held that the 
judicial proceedings privilege precludes claims like those presented here based on 
allegations that attorneys conducted improper discovery with police assistance and 
obtained unlawful court orders." Defendants' Opening Memorandum, at 5 (emphasis 
added), R. 258. However, only one of defendants' cited cases even involved a search 
and seizure.8 Defendants expressly represented that Form Precision, Inc. v. 
International Business Machines Corp., 673 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1982), is "based on 
allegations that attorneys conducted improper discovery with police assistance and 
obtained unlawful court orders." See Defendants' Opening Memorandum, at 5, R. 258 
8The remaining cases cited by defendants did not come close to mentioning the 
issue. Plaintiffs have no quarrel with the general propositions that a privilege exists to 
make defamatory statements in litigation, that the privilege is absolute, that it protects 
witnesses, lawyers, parties and judges from liability for making defamatory statements 
or that the privilege lasts throughout the entire litigation, which are propositions for 
which three Utah cases cited by defendants stand, namely, Riddle v. Perry, 2002 UT 
10, 40 P.3d 1128; DeBry v. Godbe, 1999 UT 111, 992 P.2 979; Beezley v. Hansen, 4 
Utah 2d 64, 286 P.2d 1057 (1955). Nor do plaintiffs quarrel with the general proposition 
that the privilege bars all claims for injury caused by the defamatory statement, whether 
sounding in defamation, intentional interference or otherwise, for which the Utah case 
of Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251 (Utah 1997), cited by defendants stands. The 
unlawful entry into a home, search thereof and seizure of property is not, however, a 
"publication" of "defamatory statements" with which the cited cases were concerned. 
See Riddle, 2002 UT 10 at fl 4, 40 P.3d at 1131 ("77?e defamatory statement at issue 
in this case . . .." Emphasis added.); DeBry, 1999 UT 111 at U 4, 992 P.2d at 982 ("'Ms. 
DeBry's attorney, Clark Sessions, responded by letter to Judge Wilkinson the following 
day, stating that Godbe's letter was an attempt "to demean, libel and defame Ms. 
DeBry.'"" Emphasis added.); Beezley, 4 Utah 2d at 66, 286 P.2d at 1058 ("The 
publication of defamatory matter by an attorney is protected . ..." (stated in context of 
lawyer being sued for publishing slanderous statement about opposing party to client)); 
and Price, 949 P.2d at 1253 ("Price filed a civil complaint based on these comments 
in state court on June 18, 1996, against Armour and the Union, alleging libel, libel per 
se, and intentional interference with business relations." [Emphasis added.]) Tramping 
through plaintiffs' home illegally is simply not a defamatory statement. 
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A reading of the case shows that assertion to be plainly wrong. Forro Precision 
(1) did not involve the conduct of "improper discovery," (2) did not involve "unlawful 
court orders" and (3) most certainly did not involve a warrantless and illegal search of a 
private home by a private attorney. The Court in fact applied a privilege to make 
defamatory statements to the police to initiate a criminal investigation, but only as to 
statements made to the police. The Court did not apply that privilege to the conduct of 
the search and seizure. As to claims based on conduct of the search, the Court 
recognized that no California cases had decided the issue and predicted that the 
California appellate courts would allow immunity to citizens who assist the police upon 
request, in the execution of valid search warrants, derivative to the officer's own 
immunity in the execution of valid warrants, not based on any judicial proceedings or 
other privilege applicable to statements. 
The defendant in Forro Precision, International Business Machines Corporation 
("IBM") had uncovered, in a prior lawsuit against Memorex Corporation, certain 
evidence of theft of its trade secrets. Forro Precision, 673 F.2d at 1050. IBM went to 
the Santa Clara County police and the California Attorney General to have them initiate 
a criminal investigation. Id. at 1051. In the prior lawsuit, Forro Precision's president 
and its general sales manager had given deposition testimony and produced 
documents, subject to a protective order. Id. at 1050-51. The police agreed to 
investigate IBM's allegations. See id. IBM provided the police with the Forro 
documents and deposition transcripts from the IBM/Memorex litigation, which the police 
then used in probable cause affidavits presented to a magistrate by which they 
obtained a valid search warrant for Forro Precision's premises and other locations. See 
id. Because the police needed the technical assistance of IBM in executing the valid 
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search warrant, the police specifically requested, and IBM provided, IBM employees to 
assist the police. See id. at 1053-54. 
Neither Forro Precision nor any of its employees were indicted, but widespread 
publicity about the search allegedly caused great damage to the company. Id. at 1051. 
Forro Precision sued IBM for intentional Interference with its contractual relationships, 
on the theories: 
[Fjirst, that IBM orchestrated and participated in a police investigation of 
Forro in order to subject the company to a "thunderclap" of adverse 
publicity and thereby disrupt Forro's business relationships, and second, 
that IBM used deceitful means to persuade the police to cause the 
issuance of the search warrant for Forro's plant and then participated in 
the ensuing search and seizure of Forro's business records. 
Id. The Court quoted the California statute concerning privileged statements: "'A 
privileged publication or broadcast is one made- . . . 2. In any (1) legislative or (2) 
judicial proceeding, or (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law . . ..'" Id. at 
1055. The Court recognized under the applicable third prong9 that "the privilege 
applies to communications designed to prompt officials to initiate proceedings as well 
as to communications made during the course of proceedings." The Court concluded 
that "all of IBM's communications to the authorities were privileged." Id. at 1056. 
Whether IBM's participation in the search and seizure would subject it to liability 
was quite a different matter, however, and one the Court expressly recognized had not 
been decided under California law. Id. at 1053. The Court's analysis first recognized 
that California allows the police to request the aid of citizens in executing search 
warrants. Id. at 1054. The Court cited a California statute affording such a requested 
9
 It is apparent that the Court is discussing the third prong by its statement of the 
applicable policy: "Underlying the privilege is the policy of encouraging freedom of 
communication between citizens and public authorities charged with investigating 
wrongdoing." Id. 
citizen all of the powers as the supervising police officer delegates. Id. The Court 
reviewed California law making an officer "immune from suit arising out of the execution 
of a valid warrant" Id (Emphasis added). The Court then held: "We think that 
California Penal Code section 830.6(b) must be understood as according a citizen 
immunity that derives from the officer's own immunity." Id. 
Thus, the immunity afforded IBM for its participation in the search was in no way 
related to the privilege to make defamatory statements to the police, but instead was 
strictly derivative of the immunity of the police, themselves. Because there was no 
question that the search warrant was valid and the request from the police for 
assistance was reasonable, IBM's conduct was privileged. 
Therefore, the Form Precision case, read correctly, actually supports plaintiffs' 
claims here. In this case, there was no criminal investigation, no validly issued search 
warrant and no request by the police to defendants to aid in the execution of a valid 
search warrant. In conclusion, there is no privilege to conduct an illegal search of 
plaintiffs' home. 
The only other case, acting as the "repeated holding" argued below by 
defendants, is Brown v. Delaware Valley Transplant Program, 372 Pa. Super. 629, 539 
A.2d 1372 (1988).10 In Brown, the judicial proceedings privilege was applied to protect 
10
 Defendants argued that "[o]ther jurisdictions similarly apply the judicial 
proceedings privilege to bar a wide range of tort claims[,] Opening Mem. at 4, R. 257, 
without specifying that such claims are, in each instance they cited, premised on 
defamatory statements. Lambdin Funeral Service, Inc. v. Griffith, 559 S.W.2d 791 
(Tenn. 1978), stands for the proposition, according to defendants, that no invasion of 
privacy action could be brought against them for conducting an illegal search and 
seizure. In fact, the Lambdin Funeral Service court expressed that the tort claims 
barred by the privilege were alleged to arise from the publication of defamatory 
statements, not an invasion of privacy by virtue of unlawful entry into a home. See id. 
at 792 ("In the instant case, each tort charged in the complaint is predicated upon the 
publication by the defendant of alleged acts of misconduct by the plaintiff."). In 
(continued...) 
a hospital's lawyer from liability for filing a judicial petition on behalf of the hospital 
which sought an order allowing the hospital to extract the organs of a brain-dead man 
whom it had been unable to identify, for use in transplants. 539 A.2d at1373. A claim 
by the decedent's relatives for malicious use of process had been dismissed by the trial 
court on grounds that it failed to state a claim because the process was not used 
against any of the plaintiffs. 539 A.2d at 1374. 
That dismissal was not appealed, so the Court's opinion does not stand for any 
proposition as to whether the judicial proceedings privilege would apply to such a claim. 
Instead, the appeal sought reversal of the dismissal of claims against the lawyer for 
10(...continued) 
Middlesex Concrete Prods. & Excav. Corp. v. Carteret Indus. Ass'n, 68 N.J. Super. 85, 
172 A.2d 22 (1961), following litigation, a testifying expert was sued for his statements 
made to his client while he was merely a consulting expert concerning a dispute 
between his client and Middlesex. The Court held that the communications with his 
client concerning the dispute but before he knew he would be a testifying expert were 
privileged, so could not form the basis of an intentional interference claim. In Silberg v. 
Anderson, 50 Cal.3d 205, 786 P.2d 365, 266 Cal.Rptr. 638 (Cal. 1990)(en banc), the 
Court held only that a divorce attorney's statement "as to [a] psychologist's neutrality 
and independence were privileged under [the Code]." Id., 50 Cal.3d at 219-20, 786 
P.2d 374, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 647-48. This holding was simply consistent with the Court's 
prior statement that the privilege "immuniz[es] participants from liability for torts arising 
from communications made during judicial proceedings . . .." Id., 50 Cal.3d at 214, 786 
P.2d at 370, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 643. Finally, the case of Thornton v. Rhoden, 245 
Cal.App.2d 80, 53 Cal.Rptr. 706 (1966), did not purport to abolish the tort of abuse of 
process because all process is obtained through judicial proceedings. To the contrary, 
although California takes an extremely narrow view of the tort, the judicial proceedings 
privilege has been declared not to apply to actions where the gravamen of the action is 
the conduct of enforcement of an order or judgment, rather than the communications to 
procure the order or judgment in the first instance. See Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal.4th 
1048, 1065, 128 P.3d 713, 724, 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 516, 529 (2006)("Here, because the 
execution of the judgment did not provide an independent basis for liability separate 
and apart from the filing of the false declarations of service, the gravamen of the action 
was the procurement of the judgment, not its enforcement. Thus, the enforcement of 
the judgment in reliance on the filing of privileged declarations of service was itself 
privileged.") Thus, even under a narrow interpretation never asserted in Utah of the 
abuse of process tort, claim over an illegal entry into plaintiffs' home, would survive. 
What the defendants communicated to the court in advance of their illegal search and 
seizure is not what plaintiffs here complain about. 
mutilation of a corpse, civil conspiracy, and assault and battery, even though the lawyer 
had never touched the decedent's body. See id. 
In that limited context, the Court ruled that the judicial proceedings privilege 
protected the lawyer from liability for filing a judicial petition, even though there was no 
defamatory statement, because preparation and filing of the petition is all the lawyer 
did. Id, 539 A.2d at 1374 ("[T]he well-pleaded averments indicate that Attorney Heed's 
only involvement in the case was his preparation of the petition pursuant to his client's 
instructions, and that all the allegations against Heed are based on his actions in the 
course of providing legal representation"). The Court relied on Pennsylvania precedent, 
stating: "The immunity bars actions for tortious behavior by an attorney other than 
defamation, so long as it was a communication pertinent to any stage of a judicial 
proceeding. Thus, the privilege barred claims for intentional interference with 
contractual or prospective contractual relations, as well as defamation. 539 A.2d at 
1374-75 (emphasis added). 
We do not know what holding the Pennsylvania court would have reached on an 
abuse of process claim, because it was not before the court. However, even with 
Pennsylvania's expansive reading of the privilege, it applies only to communication-
based claims, because the court expressly noted the absence of any conduct by the 
attorney beyond filing the petition communicating the plea for relief. Had the lawyer 
done more than communicated with the court, as the lawyers in this case conspired to 
do and did, there is no indication that a demurrer would have been sustained. 
Plaintiffs' allegations of an illegal search and seizure, under threat of kicking in 
the door to their home, detaining Moss in the home while Matkin obtained a second 
order authorizing force, when the civil litigant Yanaki was not even present, with a show 
of force including the police and multiple others present, and in blatant violation of 
plaintiffs' rights under the state and federal constitutions, raise issues for a jury to 
decide about whether such conduct, in all the circumstances, is extreme and 
outrageous. In Walsh v. Erie County Department of Job and Family Services, 240 F. 
Supp.2d 731 (N.D. Ohio 2003), the plaintiff alleged that an illegal, warrantless search of 
a private home by a state agency was extreme and outrageous conduct sufficient to 
pursue a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court, applying Ohio 
law that appears substantially identical to Utah law, see id. at 766, denied a motion for 
summary judgment, stating: "A reasonable juror, being apprized of the pertinent Fourth 
Amendment legal doctrines, including the basic sanctity of the home and the right to be 
free from unjustified intrusion, and, as well, the constitutional protection otherwise given 
to the family, could view the threats of taking the children away, the arrest, ensuing 
entry into the home, and the searches of Mr. Walsh and the family home to have been 
outrageous." Id. The pleaded facts here clearly give rise to questions for the trier of fact 
to answer about whether the conduct complained of in invading the home while Moss 
was home alone, illegally, with threats of violence and a show of force, for an illegal 
purpose, constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. 
In Bennett, "'[according to Bennett's own pleadings, the Jones Waldo 
defendants' bar order related conduct was not "intentionally engaged in ... with the 
purpose of inflicting emotional distress.'" 2003 UT 9 fl 69, 70 P.3d at 33. Moreover, the 
Bennett Court did not exclude the possibility that if more occurred than simply the filing 
of suit and use of process, an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim could be 
stated. Anderson Development supports this principle in its ruling: "As stated above, 
without more, neither the filing of a lawsuit nor the improper use of the legal process is 
sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress." 2005 UT 36 
TJ 31, 116 P.3d at 39 (emphasis added). In this case, the conduct of an illegal search 
and seizure, under the circumstances alleged, is much more, as was recognized by the 
Court in Walsh. 
Defendants claimed below that Yanaki could not sue under this tort because he 
was not present. This ignores the substantial emotional distress that defendants knew 
they would cause from the fact of the search, itself, let alone when Yanaki found out 
how his wife had been mistreated and threatened during the process. In Hatch v. 
Davis, 2006 UT 44, 558 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, the Utah Supreme Court, although 
recognizing its preference for presence and setting the bar high for a non-present 
plaintiff, rejected an absolute requirement that a plaintiff alleging intentional infliction of 
emotional distress be present to state a claim. See id. 2006 UT 44 tf 32, 558 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 28 ("Yet the door to recovery remains open for the case where conduct is so 
egregious that the plaintiff's circumstances cry out for relief."). Thus, all of the relevant 
facts must be placed before the trier of fact, something a pleading motion is not 
designed to do. 
C. THE FIRST AMENDMENT CANNOT, ON THE PLEADINGS, PROTECT DEFENDANTS 
AGAINST ALL OF PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGATIONS 
Again, defendants are not being sued because they petitioned their government 
for redress. They are being sued for their conspiracy to abuse judicial process and for 
frightening one plaintiff into opening her door, through which they passed without lawful 
consent, invaded the home of the plaintiffs and stole plaintiffs' property. The trial court 
held that Beezley v. Hansen, 4 Utah 2d 64, 286 P.2d 1057 (1955), authorized this 
misconduct. Beezley, however, had nothing to do with the First Amendment. Instead, it 
simply recognized that the judicial privilege applies to communications in demand 
letters preliminary to litigation. See Beezley, 286 P.2d at 1057-58. 
Defendants had in fact cited Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897 (10th Cir. 2000), to 
support this argument. Defendants argued that, so long as their suit against Yanki was 
not utterly without legal or factual support, they were immune from liability for 
conducting an illegal search and seizure. Defendants suggested that "plaintiffs do not 
allege, and in good faith could not allege, that lomed's claims in the lomed case were 
devoid of reasonable legal or factual support." Of course, the evidence discussed in 
and attached to R. 608 entirely refutes the false lomed claims that were asserted by 
these defendants. 
In Scott, Dr. Hern was sued for supplying a probable cause affidavit as a 
complaining witness. See id. at 909-10, 915. The Tenth Circuit's analysis of the abuse 
of process claim there focused on whether there were sufficient allegations that Dr. 
Hern knew his statements as a complaining witness were false, not on the merits of the 
underlying action. See id. at 915. Here, a sufficient showing of the falsity of the 
complaining witness affidavits is set forth in the original complaint, R. 1-112,11 in 
addition to the document handed up at oral argument, R. 608, but that is not the reason 
defendants are being sued. 
Instead, it is unquestionable, and pleaded, that a warrantless search and seizure 
is illegal and that private search warrants are illegal, both under federal and Utah law. 
Plaintiffs' allegations clearly establish such illegality, such that defendants could not 
attempt to point to the private search warrant they obtained as justification for a search. 
Finally, on Scott's False Imprisonment claim, the Tenth Circuit recognized that 
the tort's element of illegality "effectively prevents any infringement on or chilling of 
Hern's First Amendment rights by the instant action." Id. at 916. So, too, here, does 
the illegality of defendants' conduct prevent any infringement on or chilling of their First 
11
 Notably, Scott was a summary judgment decision, not a determination of the 
adequacy of the pleadings. See id. 
Amendment rights, so there is no First Amendment privilege. 
Of like effect is Protect Our Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District Court, 677 
P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984)(en banc) also cited by defendants below, that states: "The right 
to petition government, however, is not without limits. The First Amendment does not 
grant a license to use the courts for improper purposes." Id. at 1366.12 Illegal searches 
and seizures cannot be characterized as proper, by their very illegal nature. Nor is 
there any reasonable basis to approach a court of law to seek an illegal private search 
warrant. There simply is no infringement on or chilling of defendants' First Amendment 
rights that results from suing them for engaging in the illegal conduct of tramping 
through plaintiffs' home.13,14 
12
 The Colorado court did adopt a singular procedure not recognized by the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, of requiring that every pleading-based motion on such a 
privilege claim be treated as a summary judgment motion and requiring that evidentiary 
material be submitted to support a showing that the privilege does not apply. See id. at 
1368-69. The Utah courts have never mandated such a departure from the 
requirements for a moving party to prevail under UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(c). 
13
 Defendants cited DeVaney v. Thriftway Mktg. Corp., 124 N.M. 512, 953 P.2d 
277 (1997), asserting that it follows Scott and Protect Our Mountain Environment. 
However, Scott and Protect Our Mountain Environment were grounded in the A/oerr-
Pennington doctrine, which the New Mexico court recognized, but did not adopt. 
Instead, the Court revisited its litigation-based torts and revised them wholesale. See 
id., passim. 
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 Defendants cited to the trial court Searle v. Johnson, 709 P.2d 328 (Utah 
1985), as recognizing the limitations the First Amendment places on state law tort 
claims. However, the facts of Searle are remarkably different. There, plaintiffs, who 
owned a business in Uintah County, sued a group of political activists who conducted a 
media campaign urging a tourist boycott of Uintah County because they wanted to 
effect improvements in conditions at a local dog pound. See id. at 328-29. Finding an 
insufficient governmental interest in restricting the peaceful political activity of the 
defendants, the Court held that the First Amendment protected politically-motivated 
speech of the defendants. See id. at 330. This case does not involve politically-
motivated speech. The Utah Supreme Court has in fact never extended First 
Amendment immunity beyond politically-motivated petitions. In Anderson Development 
Co., LC. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 116 P.3d 323, a case cited by defendants in another 
section of their Opening Memorandum, our Supreme Court recognized the 
(continued...) 
In short, no case has held that a First Amendment right exists to conduct an 
illegal search and seizure, even when relying on an illegal private search warrant. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Appellants respectfully request that the judgment 
of the trial court granting judgment on the pleadings be reversed, in its entirety, and that 
this case be remanded for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of July, 2009. 
PETERS I SCOFIELD 
A Professional Corporation 
DAVID W. SCOFIELD 
THOMAS W. PETERS 
Attorneys for the Appellants 
14(...continued) 
development of the privilege: "Over the years, courts have extended this immunity 
doctrine, referred to as the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
505 U.S. 377, 420, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 LEd.2d 305 (1992), to 'protect... political 
activity against tort claims as well as antitrust claims/ Searle v. Johnson, 646 P.2d 682, 
684 (Utah 1982)." Id, 2005 UT 46 at H 26, 116 P.3d at 332. 
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APPENDIX 1 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 




PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN, GEE 
& LOVELESS, a Utah professional 
Corporation; et aL, 
Defendants. 
The Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings as to counts 2 through 7 of the first 
amended complaint. The Court heard the motions on February 15,2007, with Alan L. Sullivan 
appearing for the Defendants and David W. Scofield appearing for the Plaintiffs. After hearing 
oral arguments the Court took the motion under advisement. The Court having reviewed the 
material provided now rules on the motion. 
This is the third time some of these parties and some of these issues have been before the 
courts. First, Iomed, Inc. (" Iomed") sued Jamal Yanaki ("Yanaki") and others on or about April 
12,2002. The parties settled that case without trial. Later, Yanaki sued Iomed and others in the 
federal disrict court alleging a Section 1983 civil rights violation. That case was dismissed. The 
federal court did not find a Section 1983 violation and declined to hear the state law claims. The 
third court action is Susan L Moss ("Moss") and Yanaki suing Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & 
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Loveless, a Utah professional corporation ("Parr Waddoups") and others. Parr Waddoups is the 
law firm that represented lomed in the first action. 
This case centers around a discovery order issued by the court in the first action. Parr 
Waddoups received a discovery order allowing them to go into Yanaki's home and take 
information from his computer. The order was issued by a district court judge. The Petitioners 
claim this was a search and seizure under the criminal law and not a valid discovery order under 
the civil law. 
If Plaintiffs' position is accepted, then there could be no real discovery in a civil action of 
this nature. lomed would have to give advance notice of the material to be discovered. If Yanaki 
had indeed stolen trade secrets and they were on his computer, he would have ample opportunity 
to hide the material or destroy it. There is little reason to suppose that a person who would steal 
such things would not hide or destroy them to avoid being found out. 
In this case the Defendants did everything that they could reasonably have been expected 
to do. They filed a lawsuit, moved for an order to conduct immediate discovery, supported the 
motion by affidavits, received an order allowing immediate discovery issued by a district judge, 
and, when a problem arose during the attemped search, even obtained a supplemental order in aid 
of enforcement. The discovery order and the execution of it were carefully limited. Those 
executing the discovery order were escorted directly to the computer. Nothing else in the house 
was searched. Only the computer information was taken. Copies were left for Yanaki. The 
original was not given to lomed but to the court. It was to be used only as authorized by the 
court. A law enforcement officer, assisted by others, executed the discovery order. The one 
offensive aspect of the executiqq of the discovery order was the presence of a lawyer from Parr 
Waddoups. This seems less offensive, however, when it is remembered that counsel is normally 
present during discovery. The Parr Waddoups lawyer only did what the order authorized him to 
do, The discovery order was reasonable and necessary to preserve evidence. There are very few 
instances when this kind of discovery would be justified and this one of them. It does not offend 
the Court's sense of justice to see it used in a case such as this. 
The discovery order also affected Moss. She lived with Yanaki and was his fiancee. She 
was the person at home when the discovery order was executed. In the current action her counsel 
refers to Moss and Yanaki as a married couple. Since the computer was in their home she 
became subject to the discovery order and is bound by the outcome of the lomed action. She was 
not a party in the lomed case but she could have intervened in it. The discovery order was 
intended to affect Moss minimally. It was directed to the contents of the computer which could 
not be reached without entering their home. 
The Plaintiff, Yanaki, should have objected to the supposed illegality of the discovery 
order in the initial lomed case wherein he was sued. He never pressed an objection to that order. 
He settled the case so there was no appeal. It is, therefore, presumed that the discovery order was 
valid. Yanaki took an active part in that case. He raised thirty-one defenses and included three 
counts in his counterclaim none of which dealt with the discovery order. He had an obligation to 
challenge the order if he felt it was illegal or even improperly issued, especially since lomed's 
case depended upon it. The Plaintiffs are collaterlly estopped from pursuing this claim. 
Counts two through stv^n of the amended complaint are all interconnected. None can 
stand independent of the discovery order. All are based on it 
This Court must also recognize the Defendants' right to petition government. The parties 
to a lawsuit are subject to the doctrine of judicial privilege. The judicial proceedings privilege 
"is based upon a public policy of securing to attorneys as officers of the court the utmost freedom 
in their efforts to secure justice for their clients." Beezlev v. Hansen. 4 Utah 2d 64,286 P.2d 
1057 (1955). The Defendants were operating within the framework of this privilege. 
The Defendants' motion to dismiss counts two through seven of the amended complaint 
is granted. Counsel for the Defendants is directed to draw the formal order. 
Dated this 20th day of March, 2007. 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on Motions was sent 
via U.S. Post Office, on this 20th day of March, 2007, to the following: 
David W. Scofield 
Ronald F. Price 
Peters Schofield Price 
340 Broadway Centre 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Alan L. Sullivan 
James D. Gardner 
Snell&WilmerLXJP. 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SUSAN I. MOSS and JAMAL S. YANAKI, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & 
LOVELESS, a Utah professional 
corporation; CLARK WADDOUPS; 
JONATHAN O. HAFEN; JUSTIN P. 
MATKIN; and JOHN DOES I through XX, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AS 
TO COUNTS II THROUGH VII OF THE 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Case No. 050913371 
[ Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
On February 15,2007, Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Counts II 
through VII of the First Amended Complaint came for hearing before the Court, with the 
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, Senior Judge, presiding. David-W Scofield appeared-on behalf 
of plaintiffs, and Alan L. Sullivan appeared on behalf of defendants. At the close of oral 
argument, the Court took the motion under advisement On March 20, 2007, the Court issued its 
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Based upon the Court's previous Ruling on Motion, and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants' Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings is hereby granted, and Counts II through VII of the First Amended 
Complaint, are hereby dismissed with prejudice for the reasons set forth in the Court's Ruling on 
Motion. 
DATED this J_ day of Apifl, 2007. 
Approved as to form: 
is SCHOFIELD PRICE 
f
. Scofield, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the f day of -April, 2007, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was served by first class mail, postage prepaid, to: 
David W. Scofield 
Ronald F. Price 
PETERS SCHOFIELD PRICE 
340 Broadway Centre 
111 East Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004 
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Attorneys fox Defendants 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE-OF UTAH 
SUSAN I. MOSS and JAMAL S \ANAK1, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & 
LOVELESS, a Utah professional corporation, j 
CLARK WADDOUPS; JONATHAN O. I Case No. 05091^ 
HAFEN; JUSTIN P. MATKIN; and JOHN 
DOES I through XX, 
Defendants. 
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On November 6, 2008, the Utah Couit &&p$mp-ffif&sb& this Court's September 17, 
2007 order denying Defendants* motion for partial* stimm'gtfy judgment on count I of the first 
amended complaint. The case was remitted to 'this court on Jamiaij T 12, 2009. Based upon the 
ruling of the Court of Appeals, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary' Judgment as 
to Count I of the First Amended Complaint, dated 'T&^ai^SSS^O^-b GRANTED, As the 
93B65S7 
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remaining claims, counts 11 through YIl ot the tost amended complaint, were previously 
dismissed with prejudice on May 7, 2007, this order resolves all remaining claims between the 
parties. This order constitutes the entry of final judgment by the Court, 
Dated this m day of-fentrary, 2009. 
Approved as to Form: 
TESRSlSCOHE 
A Professional CoYporatii 
avid W, Scofield 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge Joseph C, Fratto 
Third Judicial District 
9386587 
